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NEGLIGENCE. OWNER OF CAR WHO LvEs KEYS IN PARKED VEHICLE NOT
LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY THIEF
Richards v. Stanley1 was an appeal before the Supreme Court of California
from a decision of the District Court of Appeals reversing a judgment of nonsuit
by the Superior Court.
One of the defendants had parked their car in downtown San Francisco. She
left the car unlocked and the keys in the ignition. This was a violation of a mumcl-
pal ordinance which prohibited leaving a car unattended, "without first stopping
the engine and taking the ignition key from the vehicle. ' 2 Shortly thereafter a
thief stole the car and by his negligent operation thereof injured the plaintiff. The
plaintiff contended that the defendants were negligent in leaving the car in such a
condition, and that their negligence was the legally responsible cause of the injury
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for a nonsuit. The District
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the cause holding that the
issues of negligence and proximate cause were questions for the triers of fact. On
appeal before the Supreme Court of California, speaking for the court, Justice
Traynor held that as a matter of law, the defendant had no duty to protect the
paintiff from injury Therefore there was no question of negligence or proximate
cause for the trier of fact to pass upon.
Given these facts, was the court correct in so ruling or should the issues of
negligence and causation have been left to the jury? The question develops in the
following manner-
Where A is injured by the negligence of B as a result of a situation created
by C, C's liability to A depends on whether C, as a "reasonable man," should have
foreseen B's act.3 If B's act is foreseeable C owes a duty of care to A, and will be
liable for the breach of that duty
"Foreseeability" of an intervening act is normally a question of fact to be de-
termined by the trier of fact.4 However, where the evidence is uncontested and
there is only one reasonable conclusion that can be reached, the court may, as a
matter of law, resolve the question and find that C had no duty to protect B from
A's negligence.5 With this in mind we shall examine the position of the court in the
present case.
The court, in holding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to pro-
tect him from the injury caused by the thief, relied chiefly on the proposition that:
"the owner of an automobile is under no duty to persons who may be injured by
its use to keep it out of the hands of a third person in the absence of facts putting the
owner on notice that the third person is incompetent to handle it."6
143 A.C. 58, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
2 S. F MUNICIPAL (TRAFFIC) CODE § 69.
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 453 (1939), 38 Am. JUR., Negligence, § 352, p. 1060.
4 lbid.
5 Cuneo v Connecticut Co., 124 Conn. 647, 2 A.2d 220 (1938), Aringer v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 173 Md. 416, 196 Atl. 111 (1938), Wax v Co-operative Ass'n, 154 Neb. 42,
46 N.W.2d 769 (1951).
6 43 A.C. at 62, 271 P.2d at 27 Lane v Bing, 202 Cal. 590, 262 Pac. 318 (1927). Here the
plaintiff sustained injury by the negligent operation of a car by a minor. It was held that there
was no duty on the parents to protect the plaintiff where there was no knowledge that their
minor son was incompetent.
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For further support of his decision Justice Traynor pointed out the inconsist-
ency of holding that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff in view of Section
402 of the Vehicle Code which states:
"Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to
person or property resulting from. negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle,
by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner, and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner for all
purposes of civil damages." (Emphasis added.)
Another part of the section restricts the owner's liability to $5,000 in some
cases and $10,000 in others. Justice Traynor concludes that liability would pro-
duce an anomaly; that is, the owner of an automobile would bear the burden of
unlimited liability when a thief stole his car and subsequently injured another,
while his liability is restricted where he voluntarily allows another to use his
automobile.
Justice Spence wrote a dissenting opinion. Citing two District of Columbia
cases (discussed below) he maintained that whether the leaving of the key in the
ignition switch of the defendants' unlocked car on a downtown street was negli-
gence, and if so, whether it was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries were ques-
tions on which reasonable minds might differ, and so were for the jury's deter-
mination.
There have been no previous cases directly in point decided in California.
Therefore it will be of value to see how other jurisdictions have resolved cases
involving similar facts.
In the District of Columbia and Illinois there is support for Justice Spence's
contention. In Schaff v. ClaxtonT the defendant left the keys in his car, and a thief
stole it, subsequently injuring the plaintiff. The court held the question of the fore-
seeability of the thief's act was for the jury This case relied upon an earlier de-
cision in Ross v. Hartman.8 In this case there was the added fact that the act of
leaving the keys was in violation of a statute. The court held that this was negli-
gence per se. The defendant's liability was predicated on the reasoning that the
statute was intended to protect the public from the negligent operation of stolen
vehicles. In the principal case there was a violation of a similar statute. But this
ordinance expressly stated, "nor shall this section or any violation thereof be ad-
missable as evidence affecting recovery in a civil action."0 (Emphasis added.)
In Ostergard v. Frsc.'0 the Illinois Appellate Court, citing Ross v. Hartman,"
held the owner liable for the thief's act on the basis of negligence per se in the
violation of a similar statute. A subsequent Illinois Appellate decision, Cockrell
v. Sullivan,'2 disapproved this holding and overruled it in favor of no liability of
the owner, regardless of the violation of the statute. The Supreme Court of Illinois
resolved the conflict between these cases in Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.3 Here an em-
ployee of the defendant taxicab company, while in the scope of his employment,
left the taxicab unattended with the key in the ignition and the motor runnmng.
7 144 F.2d 532 (D.C.Cir. 1944).
8 139 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1943).
9 See note 2 supra.
10333 fllApp. 359, 77 N.E.2d 539 (1948).
i1 See note 8 supra
12 344 IilApp. 620, 101 N.E.2d 878 (1951).
13 2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
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This was a violation of the Uniform Traffic Act. A thief stole the cab and in making
his escape negligently drove into a parked automobile. The Supreme Court of Illi-
nois said that under the facts presented there was no persuasive authority and no
impelling reason for the court to hold, as a matter of law that negligence could not
exist and therefore the question was for the trier of fact.
As the above cases strengthen the dissent of Justice Spence, so do the follow-
ing uphold the majority opinion. In Massachusetts the court in Slater v. Baker,14
on facts similar to the principal case, held, as a matter of law that the act of the
thief was a superseding cause precluding the owner's liability This decision was
followed in Sullivan v. Grzffin15 where the owner not only left the ignition keys
in the car but also parked it blocking a sidewalk, in violation of a statute. How-
ever, in the case of Malloy v. Newman16 the court, though approving the above
cases, sent the question of the foreseeability of the thief's act to the jury on the
distinguishing fact that the car was unregistered, in violation of a state statute.
The most recent Massachusetts case in point, Galbraith v. LeVwn, 17 held this dubi-
ous distinction to be invalid and overruled Malloy v. Newman.
Minnesota also is in accord with the California decision. In Wannebo v.
Gates,'8 where the injury took place sometime after the theft, the court held the
owner not responsible but implied by way of dictum that they might hold other-
wise if the thief was "in flight" from the scene of crime. However, when the same
court was presented with such a case in Anderson v. Theisen'9 it refused to put the
question of foreseeability to the jury
Besides the above jurisdictions the courts of New York,2 0 Maine,21 New Jer-
sey,2 and Louisiana 23 have passed on the question in point. They have all taken
the position that the thief's act is a superseding cause and that there is no ques-
tion of the owner's liability for the jury
Thus, in the light of the authorities of other states, the holding of the California
court on the facts of the principal case is with the majority However, it is more
important that these cases bear out two underlying, conflicting, judicial policies.
These, in the last analysis, determine whether a duty could be present; whether
the thief's act is a question about which reasonable men may differ. One is the
view that a car owner's liability for acts of third parties should be confined to those
situations over which he has some substantial degree of control. The other view
would place the burden of loss upon the car owner who negligently created the
situation conducive to theft and injury
An illustration of the latter view is to be found in the opinion of the court in
Ross v. Hartman.
14 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927).
15 318 Mass. 358, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945).
16310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001 (1941).
17323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948).
18 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W.2d 695 (1948).
19 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
20 Lotitov v. Kynacus, 272 App.Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1947), Wilson v. Harrington,
269 App.Div. 891, 56 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1945), aft'd, 295 N.Y. 677, 65 N.E.2d 101 (1946).
21 Curtis v. Jacobsen, 14 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947).
22 Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (1950).
2 3 Midiff v. Wakns, 52 So.2d 573 (La. 1951), Costay v. Bestoff, 148 So. 76 (La. 1933).
But see Maggiore v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service, 150 So. 394 (La. 1933).
[Vol. 6THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
